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n Wednesday, November 29, 2006, the United States
Supreme Court heard the oral arguments for Massachu-
setts v. Environmental Protection Agency.1 The case
revolves around the ability of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) to regulate carbon dioxide (“CO2”) under the
Clean Air Act (“CAA”); a seemingly minute point of law, unim-
portant to those outside of the environmental community and
those regulated by the EPA.2 In reality, the case has the potential
to affect how the United States goes forward in developing a pol-
icy to address climate change.3 It is the first time the Supreme
Court will deal with the issue of climate change. The opinion of
the Court will surely have a ripple effect: impacting pending cli-
mate change cases in lower courts, shaping the future of the
standing doctrine, and spurring Congress to develop a climate
change policy in the face of an administration that has, to date,
decided not to mandate any reg-
ulation of CO2 emissions.4
Unsatisfied with the admin-
istration’s response, many envi-
ronmental groups, states, and
local governments are looking to
current environmental and tort
law to begin regulating the emis-
sion of CO2 and other green-
house gases (“GHGs”) through
court orders.5 This is evident by
the litany of current litigation
ranging from states bringing nui-
sance suits against power compa-
nies and automakers to the line
of cases arguing for federal regulation under the CAA, such as
Massachusetts v. EPA.6 Another line of cases falls under the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).7 While unable to
force the regulation of CO2, NEPA does require federal agencies
to consider the environmental impacts of their actions, potentially
including the impacts of CO2 emissions.8 Though the usefulness
of bringing NEPA litigation for the lack of or inadequacy of con-
sideration given to CO2 emissions is debatable,9 this article will
focus on a narrow question: Can courts force federal agencies to
take a “hard look” at the impacts of climate change due to the
release of CO2 emissions stemming from the agency’s actions?
While NEPA does not provide a means to create, or force
the administration to develop, any such regulations,10 NEPA can
force federal agencies to at least consider and disclose to the
public the impacts their actions will have due to contributions to
CO2 emissions. This article examines the requirements and case
law of NEPA with respect to climate change and explores a
hypothetical lawsuit concerning the lack of federal environmen-
tal documentation for the planned reliance on coal-fired power
plants (“CFPPs”) to provide the majority of the nation’s new
sources of electric power.11 Next, this article will introduce the
basic requirements of NEPA and the Council on Environmental
Quality’s (“CEQ”) implementing regulations, and the science of
climate change. The article will analyze what little case law there
is on NEPA and climate change, including Border Power Plant
Working Group v. Department of Energy, Mayo Foundation v.
Surface Transportation Board, and Friends of the Earth v. Mos-
bacher, two of which are currently pending. Finally, the article will
discuss the planned future reliance on CFPPs and a hypothetical






tal Policy Act requires federal
agencies to take a “hard look” at
the environmental consequences
of their proposed actions.12 Sec-
tion 102, the action forcing sec-
tion, requires agencies to write
Environmental Impact State-
ments (“EIS”) for “major Fed-
eral actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment.”13 NEPA sepa-
rates all federal agency actions into three categories: major
actions, non-major actions, and categorical exclusions.14 Of
these three, only major actions fall under the purview of
NEPA.15 Major federal actions are further broken down into two
categories: those that have a significant impact on the quality of
the human environment and those that have no significant
impact.16 In making the determination if an action will have a
significant impact, agencies begin by preparing an Environmen-
tal Assessment (“EA”).17 Much more concise than an EIS, EAs
provide public documentation of what the agency took into con-
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sideration to determine whether their proposed action will have a
significant impact on the environment.18 If there is no significant
impact, the agency issues a document explaining how the agency
came to their conclusion called a Finding of No Significant
Impact (“FONSI”).19 On the other hand, if it appears that the
proposed action will have a significant impact, the agency must
prepare a full EIS.20 Courts have maintained that NEPA is purely
procedural and has no enforceable substantive mandates.21
Therefore, as long as an agency follows the appropriate proce-
dure in making decisions, an agency can take a course of action
that is not the most environmentally sound.22
In order to satisfy the requirements of NEPA, an EIS must
discuss, among other things: environmental impacts, including
adverse effects, of the proposed action; alternatives to the pro-
posed action; and irreversible commitments of resources.23 The
CEQ, through its implementing regulations, further clarified and
expanded upon the requirements set out in section 102(C) of
NEPA, primarily through defining “effects” as those that are,
“direct, indirect, or cumulative,” and “cumulative impacts,” as,
“past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regard-
less of what agency (federal or non-federal) or person under-
takes such other actions.”24 It is through these definitions that
NEPA has the potential to evolve and broaden its scope as the
scientific understanding of the environment grows of just how
significant the impacts of climate change, induced by anthro-
pogenic emissions of CO2 and other GHGs, truly are.
CLIMATE CHANGE IS A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT
The necessity of constraining GHG emissions is a global
problem, but the United States is responsible for largest percent-
age of the problem, compared to all other nations.25 CO2 is not
the only GHG, but it is by far the most prevalent, and in 2002,
the United States accounted for over twenty percent of the
world’s total CO2 emissions.26 While a large portion of the world
is trying to decrease emissions, any net increase in CO2 emis-
sions from the U.S. will only serve to exacerbate the impacts of
climate change.27 Nevertheless, the question remains whether
U.S. emissions are “significant” under NEPA? One effect of a
major federal action may be a slight, seemingly miniscule,
increase in worldwide CO2 emissions.28 An increase in CO2
emissions that amounts to less than one percent of worldwide
emissions of CO2 is not the sole cause of climate change, and
preventing or lessoning that amount of the CO2 emissions will
not stop climate change.29 It is also currently not possible to
determine the correlation between the CO2 emissions from one
action and the increase in temperature.
Perhaps a direct correlation between cause and effect and
comparing the CO2 emissions from one action to total world-
wide emissions is the incorrect approach, both in theory and in
law. After all, NEPA and the CEQ regulations require the consid-
eration of cumulative impacts.30 As stated earlier, cumulative
impacts include those that are, “past, present, and reasonably
foreseeable.”31 Moreover, “cumulative impacts can result from
individually minor but collectively significant actions taking
place over a period of time.”32 The release of CO2 emissions and
impacts of climate change could arguably fall under the scope of
cumulative impacts. The court’s interpretation of cumulative
impacts, however, has likely neutered this approach.33 Cumula-
tive impacts must be related to the proposed project and within
the affected area.34 Because of the narrow view of “cumulative
impacts,” it is unlikely that impacts of the CO2 emissions from
any one project and related activities will be seen as significantly
impacting the environment via climate change. 
Another potential option to have the impact of an increase in
CO2 emissions deemed significant is through Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statements (“PEIS”). Along with individ-
ual agency actions, programs also fall under the purview of
NEPA.35 These broader EISs have the ability to look at the larger
scale impacts of multiple projects that may later each get their
own NEPA analysis. It remains to be seen if federal agencies or
courts will ever view the emissions of CO2 as “significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment,” and the out-
come of pending cases may determine which of the approaches,
if any, will be successful. 
CURRENT CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION
INVOLVING NEPA
The perceived inaction on climate change has given rise to
several lawsuits.36 Of these, a court has decided only one NEPA
case,37 while three other NEPA cases are currently pending.38
The cases follow one of two strategies: (1) Attacking individual
actions by agencies, and their corresponding NEPA documen-
tation, for failure to consider impacts GHG emissions; or 
(2) Attacking agency programs on a broader scale for their fail-
ure to do a PEIS. This article will analyze three of these cases.
The first, Border Power Plant Working Group v. Department of
Energy (hereinafter “BPPWG”), was successful in requiring the
Department of Energy (“DOE”) to include CO2 emissions and
impacts on climate change, however, DOE ultimately skirted the
issue by dismissing the amount a CO2 emitted as “negligible” in
their EIS.39 The second case, Mayo Foundation v. Surface Trans-
portation Board (Mid State Coalition for Progress v. Surface
Transportation Board) (hereinafter “Mayo”), was also success-
ful in requiring an agency to consider the impacts of climate
change.40 Again, the agency skirted the issue by stating that the
increase in emissions would be minor.41 The plaintiffs are now
challenging the adequacy of the Supplemental Environmental
Impact Statement (“SEIS”).42 The final case, Friends of the
Earth v. Mosbacher, formerly Friends of the Earth v. Watson
(hereinafter “FOE”), differs as it takes the approach that the
defendant agencies are required to do a PEIS under NEPA.43
BORDER POWER PLANT WORKING GROUP V. 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
In BPPWG, plaintiffs challenged a DOE FONSI for permit-
ting transboundary transmission lines entering the United States
from Mexico.44 The planned transmission lines were to originate
from two different power plants, the La Rosita Power Complex
(“LRPC”) and the Termoelectrica de Mexicali power plant
(“TDM”).45 After determining the plaintiffs had standing, the
court moved to the merits of the case — did the emissions of the
power plants fall under the purview of NEPA via indirect
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effects.46 The court, after analyzing the case law, concluded that
the “indirect effect” must be causally linked to the federal
action.47 In order to determine if DOE needed to consider the
emissions of power plants, the court looked at the likelihood of
each plant operating without the transmission lines, thereby
establishing, or not, a causal link to the federal action.48 The first
plant, LRPC, consisted of four turbines — two for production of
electricity for use primarily in Mexico, and two for the export of
electricity to U.S. markets.49 All of the turbines at the TDM
power plant were for the production of electricity to export to
U.S. markets.50 Based on this, the court held that the impacts
from the two LRPC turbines and all the TDM turbines had to be
considered under NEPA, while the impacts from the two LRPC
turbines for use in Mexico did not need to be considered.51
The District Court in BPPWG fashioned a well-reasoned
opinion to require DOE to take into account CO2 emissions from
the power plants. Though exclusion of the two LRPC turbines is
not desirable, it is understandable: even without the transmission
lines, those turbines would exist and emit CO2.52 It is reasonable
to see the pollution from those two turbines as unconnected to
the federal action. Unfortunately, after such a favorable court
opinion, DOE summarily dis-
missed the CO2 emissions as
“negligible.”53 Such actions begs
the question, are the emissions
from any one federal action ever
enough to be considered signifi-
cant? The following two cases
try to deal with this question and




Before the court in Mayo is
the Surface Transpor tat ion
Board’s (“SBT”) Section on Environmental Analysis’s (“SEA”)
EIS that approved new rail lines and upgrading of older lines.54
The plaintiffs in Mayo challenged the EIS in a prior lawsuit, and
the court found the EIS to be inadequate, in part because, “SEA
wholly failed to consider the effects on air quality that an
increase in the supply of low-sulfur coal to power plants would
produce.”55 SEA argued that the rail lines would not affect the
demand for coal.56 The court did not agree with SEA’s argument,
and agreed with the intervener rail company’s (“DM&E”)
assessment that it would increase the demand for coal.57 How-
ever, DM&E argued that despite the increased demand, SEA’s
EIS did not need to consider the impacts on air quality because
they were too speculative.58 The court, to the contrary, viewed
the “speculative” impacts as “indirect impacts” and therefore
NEPA still required their consideration.59 Indirect impacts must
still be “reasonably foreseeable.”60 The court found that even
though the “extent” of the impacts is not certain, the “nature” of
the impacts was reasonably foreseeable.61 SEA also argued that
because the pollutants emitted were regulated under the CAA,
any emissions from increased use of coal would not be signifi-
cant.62 The court also found this argument unconvincing.63 Ulti-
mately, the court held that even though some of the gases emit-
ted into the air would be capped under the CAA, they would still
have an environmental impact, and not all of the gases emitted,
notably CO2, are regulated under the CAA.64 The court went as
far as to say that the EIS’s lack of analysis with respect to the
increased coal consumption was “irresponsible.”65
After the 2003 court decision, STB published an SEIS.66
The SEIS, using models of coal supply and demand, concluded
that any increases in coal consumption would be minor.67 There-
fore, STB reasoned, that any increase in emissions would not
have significant impacts.68 The plaintiffs from the 2003 case
have brought suit again claiming the SEIS’s consideration of the
impacts is inadequate, including the treatment of climate
change.69 How the Eighth Circuit treats this new challenge may
determine how plaintiffs proceed with NEPA lawsuits as a
means to address climate change. As with BPPWG, Mayo’s
defendant agency ultimately did discuss climate change in its
EIS. However, both agencies dismissed the amount of emissions
as not significant, and therefore did not fully analyze their contri-
bution to the broader impacts on the environment due to climate
change. If the court finds that
STB did adequately consider the
impacts, the decision has the
potential to allow all agencies to
dismiss the impacts of GHGs as
minor because each individual
project does not emit a large
percentage of total worldwide
emissions.
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH
V. MOSBACHER
FOE is attempting to get
around the problem of negligi-
ble emissions by arguing the
defendant federal agencies, the Overseas Project Investment
Corporation (“OPIC”) and the Export Import Bank (“EIB”),
must do a PEIS. OPIC and EIB provide financing for oversea
projects, including fossil fuel projects without any NEPA analy-
sis.70 Collectively, plaintiffs asserted that the defendants must
write a PEIS and the projects they support account for eight per-
cent of worldwide emissions.71 With a larger percentage of
worldwide total emissions affected by the agencies’ actions, this
case could prove to require the agencies to actually consider the
impacts of climate change instead of brushing them aside as
negligible.
The only decision in regards to the case, in August of 2005,
allowed the plaintiffs to survive a challenge to their standing and
the claim that there has been no final agency action.72 On April
14, 2006, the court heard arguments on the merits of the case.73
The court’s 2005 opinion denying the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment is optimistic. In determining the plaintiffs
have standing, the court recognized that potential injuries caused
by climate change and increased emissions are not speculative,74
and in moving forward on the merits, the defendants have con-
Under NEPA, it is possible
that CO2 emissions from
an individual coal fired
power plant need to 
be considered.
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ceded that their actions do impact the environment and are
instead arguing that they are not subject to NEPA.75 While com-
pelling, those arguments do not need to be addressed for the pur-
poses of this article.
COAL FIRED POWER PLANTS HYPOTHETICAL
As of September 2006, the National Energy Technology
Lab, an agency under DOE, estimates there are currently 154
proposed or new (since 2000) CFPPs, and by 2030, there could
be as many as 300 new CFPPs.76 Though it is difficult, if not
impossible, to estimate the increase in CO2 emissions these
plants will create, one thing is certain: the forecasted depend-
ence on a large number of new CFPPs will affect climate
change.77 Absent a mandatory federal policy on climate
change,78 it is unclear if the emissions of CO2 from the new
CFPPs will be regulated or even analyzed for their total cumula-
tive impacts. Under NEPA, it is possible that CO2 emissions
from an individual CFPP need to be considered, but it is unlikely
that individual CFPP’s emissions would exceed 0.5 percent of
world CO2 emissions and therefore, pending the decision in
Mayo, could be considered “negligible.”79 In order to gain a bet-
ter understanding of how much of a significant impact the over
150 new CFPP CO2 emissions will have on climate change, a
more comprehensive analysis should be done under NEPA via a
PEIS, but determining which federal agency is responsible for
the PEIS could prove to be a fatal flaw in such an approach.
The continued reliance on coal presents a tremendous envi-
ronmental challenge. In order to even begin to understand just
how much of an increase in CO2 emissions will result from the
new “boom” in CFPPs, some sort of environmental analysis is
needed from the federal government. However, it is difficult to
determine which federal agency is responsible for these new
CFPPs. While DOE tracks the construction, production, and
emissions of these new plants, they have little to no actual per-
mitting or regulatory authority over them.80 The majority of the
authority to permit the construction and operation of the plants
rests with the states the CFPP resides in or with EPA under the
CAA.81 Even under the CAA though, EPA has delegated the
majority of its permitting authority to the states and is not
required to do any NEPA review.82 With no clear solution, a
broader approach must be taken. The plaintiffs in the above-dis-
cussed cases took such approaches in order to get at the underly-
ing issue — GHG emissions from the combustion of coal and
other fossil fuels.83 In order to address the issue of new CFPPs in
their entirety, a PEIS is needed. However, such broad programs
that have causal connections to the construction of new CFPPs
are not abundant, and the ones that do exist likely have PEISs in
place or in production. If so, prospective plaintiffs can challenge
the PEIS if it did not adequately discuss the impacts of increased
CO2 emissions from CFPPs. 
One such potential agency program that may have a causal
link to increased emissions of CO2 is the Department of Inte-
rior’s Office of Surface Mining (“OSM”). OSM, among other
things, regulates mountaintop mining — a process in which the
top of a mountain is removed through the use of explosives to
get the coal within the mountain.84 For this, OSM, in conjunc-
tion with the Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Services, and the EPA, produced a lengthy PEIS.85
Within the over 500 pages of analysis — that do not mention cli-
mate change, CO2, or other related issues — lays a potential
challenge due to inadequate consideration of the indirect effects
of increase in the coal supply, analogous to Mayo, but on a
wider, programmatic level, such as in FOE.86 In event that nei-
ther Mayo nor FOE produces a favorable outcome, a lawsuit
attacking the mountaintop mining PEIS may still succeed. Such
a suit would not face the dilemma of the scope of significant
impacts, as mountaintop mining has a much greater impact than
either a single CFPP or railroad. Additionally, the proposed suit
would not face similar issues raised by the defense in FOE, as
there is clear final agency action; a PEIS has already been pub-
lished. The main issue blocking a decision on the merits for this
proposed lawsuit is, however, on the first page of the PEIS. The
agencies do accept that the PEIS was required under NEPA.87 If
such a suit is possible depends, as all suits do, on multiple other
factors as well, all of which need more review and will not be
discussed in this paper.
CONCLUSION
With climate change becoming a certainty, the United States
needs to take mandatory action to reduce its share of emissions.
In the absence of such regulation, groups are attempting to
address the problem through existing U.S. law, including through
NEPA. The impacts of climate change are significant under
NEPA, and federal agencies need to consider their contributions
to climate change prior to taking action. Some agencies are
accepting that emissions cause an impact, but the trick is now in
finding a way around dismissing each action’s individual emis-
sions as negligible. After all, it is now easy for a court to accept
climate change. However, it is more difficult for a court, and not
necessarily scientifically accurate, to accept that the small
increase in worldwide emissions from a single project will have
a correlative impact on the environment via climate change. This
very dilemma turned the seeming victory of BPPWG into noth-
ing more than a Pyrrhic victory. The pending court case, Mayo
and FOE, will play a large role in the future of climate change
litigation and NEPA analysis. If one of the cases is successful and
the agencies are either required to broaden their scope of impacts
in terms of climate change or required to do a PEIS that takes a
“hard look” at the impacts of CO2 emissions, a door will open for
further litigation. This litigation can serve to not only gain a bet-
ter understanding of climate change and the impacts it will have
on our environment, but also to aid in demonstrating the need for
mandatory regulation. With continued efforts to evolve the scope
of NEPA to encompass the full impacts of climate change, future
litigation can succeed without losing the greater struggle. 
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